In contrast, simulation theorists claim that we explain and predict the behavior of others by using our own mind as a model and putting ourselves in the place of another, that is, by imagining what our mental states would be and how we would behave if we were in the situation of the other. Specifically, we simulate each other`s mental states to create the observed behavior, and then we use the simulated mental conditions, give beliefs, and give desires as contributions by passing them through our own decision-making mechanism. We then take the resulting conclusion and incriminate it to the other person.  Authors like Vittorio Gallese have proposed an embodied simulation theory that refers to neuroscientific research on mirror neurons and phenomenological research.  The way intersubjectivity occurs varies from culture to culture. In some Native American communities, nonverbal communication is so prevalent that intersubjectivity can occur regularly among all members of the community, perhaps in part because of a « common cultural understanding » and a history of common efforts.  This « common cultural understanding » can develop within small Indigenous American communities where children grew up, integrated into the values, expectations, and livelihoods of their community —learning through participation with adults and not through intentional verbal instruction —and cooperate daily in common efforts. Growing up in this context may have led members of this community to have something that some describe as a « mixture of agendas »  or others as « the articulation of motives. »  If community or family members have the same general goals in mind, then they can act coherently in an overlapping mental state. Whether people are in the presence of the other or only within the same community, this mixture of agendas or the articulation of motives allows intersubjectivity within these common efforts.  Intersubjectivity has been used in the social sciences to refer to concordance. There is intersubjectivity between people when they agree on a number of meanings or a definition of the situation. Similarly, Thomas Scheff defines intersubjectivity as « the sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals. »  The term has also been used to refer to differences in shared (or partially shared) meanings.
Self-presentation, lies, practical jokes and social emotions, for example, do not include a common definition of the situation, but partly common differences in meaning. Someone who tells a lie is involved in an intersubjective act because he works with two different definitions of the situation. The lie is therefore really intersubjective (in the sense of the operation between two subjective definitions of reality). [Citation required] In the debate between cognitive individualism and cognitive universalism, some aspects of thought are not exclusively personal or totally universal. . . .